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Introduction
Since the 1960s, scholars have sought to elaborate different typologies of opposition,
mainly by taking into consideration systemic factors, such as the electoral and party
system, strength and composition of the executive, constitutional mechanisms and
rules of the parliamentary game, which are thought to account for the variations in the
opposition in different countries (Duverger, 1951; Sartori, 1966; Oberreuter, 1975;
Pulzer, 1987; Fabbrini, 1994; Pasquino, 1995; Flanagan, 2001). In particular,
according to the existing literature, there used to be various distinctions between
opposition in a majoritarian system and opposition in a consensus system. Competitive
2(or majoritarian) democracies emphasised on the conflict between alternative positions
so as to attain the political power and exercise it exclusively. In consensual demo-
cracies, an agreement was frequently found between the major positions so that the
political power could be shared and exercised in an inclusive way. Although typologies
of opposition based on these patterns of democracy are still extremely functional and
effective, they rely on models grounded on a typical ideal image of democracy, which
still exists in theory but does not correspond to the actual performance of political actors
(Blondel and Battegazzorre, 2002).1 In fact, empirical research has proved that the
behaviour of the opposition in parliament does not differ significantly from one country
to the other: a high level of consensus and cooperation in the law-making process can be
found between government and opposition in almost all European parliamentary
democracies (Cazzola, 1974; Di Palma, 1977; Rose, 1984; Saalfeld, 1990; Cowley
and Stuart, 2005; Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006; Andeweg et al, 2008;
Christiansen and Damgaard, 2008; Giuliani, 2008; Kaiser, 2008).
Italy is no exception – not even in the most recent years of the so-called Second
Republic. Despite the confrontational style that emerged from the new majoritarian
electoral law and the aggressive mood of the political environment, as reported by the
media since the mid-1990s, the level of the opposition’s consensus in parliament has
not decreased. In the period 1996–2006, bills were adopted with an average 90.3
per cent of favourable votes. More in detail, looking at roll-call voting in the Chamber
of Deputies – the Italian lower chamber – during the last stage, bills have been adopted
with an average 91.7 per cent of ‘ayes’ during the XIII legislature and 88.7 per cent
during the XIV legislature (Giuliani, 2008, p. 66). The Italian case demonstrates that
none of the noteworthy changes that occurred in the political system in the last 20 years
have affected the amount of consensus between government and opposition in
parliament (De Micheli, 1997; Giuliani, 1997). This invites us to explore which other
variables could affect the opposition’s behaviour and determine its (more or less)
consensual conduct in the law-making process. What could explain the persistence of a
consensual pattern of behaviour in the Italian parliament, if the systemic factors usually
invoked to explain it have been altered? What are the reasons for the opposition’s
cooperation with the government even in this renewed political scenario? Might there
be some (non-systemic) variables that could account for this persistence?
The aim of the present article is to understand which factors affect the (more or less)
consensual behaviour of the Italian parliamentary opposition in the law-making
process. This is done by examining its conduct in three recent legislative terms
between 1996 and 2008. We investigate the main reasons behind the legislative
behaviour of the parliamentary opposition in Italy, and not the extent to which it
supports the passage of government legislation. In particular, we see whether the level
of consensus of single opposition party groups is affected by two different sets of
factors: the first is related to the preferences of the actors involved in the decision-
making process, whereas the second concerns the characteristics of the approved laws.
With regard to the former, we investigate the impact of the actors’ policy preferences
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3and issue saliency on the opposition’s level of consensus. As for the latter, we
determine how the level of support for each enacted law is affected by its more or less
programmatic nature and its level of comprehensiveness (in terms of size and scope).
The article is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the Italian case
and explains why its study is also relevant from a comparative perspective. In the
second part, we briefly explain the dependent and independent variables and our
research hypotheses. In the third, we provide a brief description of the data used and
discuss the operationalisation of the main variables. Finally, we illustrate the main
findings of our analysis in the last section.
The Italian Case
One of the peculiarities of the Italian political system from 1948 was the absence of
any real government alternation for almost half a century: in fact, given its anti-systemic
nature, it was impossible for the major opposition party, the Italian Communist Party
(PCI), to really compete for power. This limited the role of the opposition to one of
checking the activity of the executive without representing a concrete alternative to the
government in office. Also given the remarkable weakness of the Italian governments,
the primary function of the opposition until the early 1990s other than criticising the
activities of the executive was to influence the government majority on what policies to
adopt. Laws approved by standing committees, agreements between parties from
opposing coalitions and bills unanimously supported were the rule in the Italian
parliament of the so-called First Republic (Della Sala, 1993; Giuliani, 2008; De Giorgi,
2011a). The transformation of the Italian political system that began in the early 1990s
was expected to have an impact on these parliamentary dynamics, and in particular on
the level of consensus in the law-making process. However, this did not happen.
Many political events occurred and contributed to radical changes in Italian
politics from the early 1990s. Italy became a mixed electoral system in 1993, with
75 per cent of parliamentary seats allocated with a British-style first past the post
system and 25 per cent with a PR method. Besides the electoral reform, Italy witnessed
the implosion of the central sector of the old party system because of the combination
of electoral losses, judicial prosecutions and party divisions between 1992 and 1994.
The 1994 election saw the start of competition between many new electoral forces,
some of which were the result of divisions, changes and restructuring in traditional
parties, and others were completely new political and electoral players. The 1994
election was won by a centre right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Because of the
extreme heterogeneity of the alliance, the new government lasted just 7 months, and a
technocratic government followed until the 1996 election. On that occasion, two large
coalitions with an identifiable leader – the candidate for Prime Minister – competed in
the general election for the first time in Italy (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000). The election
was won by a centre left coalition led by Romano Prodi.2
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4Nonetheless, the 2001 election is considered the real ‘watershed’ (Pasquino, 2002,
p. 12) between the former and the new political system. Indeed, this was when an
incumbent government first competed for power with an identifiable and alternative
opposition. This created a legitimate expectation of alternation between two different
party coalitions, and one that did eventually occur. A centre right coalition led again
by Silvio Berlusconi and composed of Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord
and Unione Democratici di Centro (UDC)3 (United Christian Democrats) won the
election and formed a new government; this lasted until the end of the legislature in
2006, although with many changes of the cabinet members. However, this was not
the end of the long transition of the Italian political system. From 2005, a PR party
list electoral law was introduced in both houses, with a majority prize to the coalition
obtaining a plurality at the national level for the Chamber of Deputies and regional
level for the Senate. The 2006 election gave a narrow victory to the centre left
coalition led by Romano Prodi, who was forced to resign in 2008: the immense
political heterogeneity of the coalition4 together with the scarce majority of seats
obtained in the Senate – also because of the different criteria of seats’ distribution
applied to the two chambers – brought the new legislature to an early end.
This long and significant transformation of the Italian political system – notably
the bipolarisation of party competition – has invited many scholars to investigate the
recent parliamentary dynamics in the expectation of finding significant differences in
the relationship between majority and opposition: in particular, a significantly lower
level of consensus in the law-making process was expected to be found. However, as
stated above, despite the intensely hostile tones used by both the coalitions in public,
there was a persistently high level of cooperation between the new opposing
coalitions that alternated in government from 1996. Although systemic factors seem
necessary, they are not sufficient to explain the variation in the opposition behaviour
in this case. There might be some further (non-systemic) variables that influence the
conduct of the opposition and may be common to different parliamentary systems.
The aim of the present work is therefore to understand which other factors could
explain the legislative behaviour of the parliamentary opposition using an analysis of
the Italian case. Our findings on the Italian parliamentary opposition will also be
valuable for comparative research. In fact, as we said, given the systemic changes
that have taken place in recent years, Italy is a perfect laboratory to carry out such a
field experiment.
The Opposition’s Reasons: Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses
As we already know how often laws are approved with the agreement of the
opposition in the Italian parliament, we now intend to investigate in more depth when
and why the opposition groups are more likely to support the passage of government
legislation. This is the question our empirical work addresses.
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government bills. We measure the level of consensus by looking at the cohesiveness
of the MPs belonging to the opposition parliamentary party groups in supporting
individual government bills; this will be discussed below when illustrating how we
operationalise our variables. However, we can anticipate that the measure of
consensus of a given opposition group to a government bill will be at its maximum
(1) when all the MPs belonging to that group support that bill. On the opposite side,
the level of consensus will be at its hypothetical minimum (0) when none of the MPs
belonging to that group support the bill. Thus, our research question is now: what
makes the Italian opposition parties more likely to express a higher (or lower) level of
consensus on a government bill? Or, more precisely, what makes these parties more
likely to cohesively support a government legislative proposal?5
As stated above, we test the influence of two different sets of factors on the voting
behaviour of the opposition parties: the first is related to the preferences of the
(collective) actors involved in the law-making process, and the second to the
characteristics of the approved laws. With regard to the former, we start by considering
political actors as purely driven by policy-seeking motivations. In this case, we can try
to answer our question by modelling the voting behaviour of the opposition parties in
basic spatial terms. From this perspective, the position of the actors involved in the
law-making arena in a given policy space (that is, the policy preference) is crucial to
understand the legislative dynamics (Tsebelis, 2002).
Here, in particular, we might expect the variation in the level of consensus of
individual opposition parties to the government bills to be explained by the discrepancy
between the respective policy preferences. Therefore, we expect that all things being
equal, the closer the government and a given opposition party are situated in a specific
policy area, the higher that opposition party’s level of consensus will be to a proposal
dealing with that policy sector.6 Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the distance between the government and the opposition
parties in terms of policy preferences, the lower the level of the
opposition parties’ consensus to the government bills will be.
Nonetheless, political actors are not simply concerned about policy goals. In fact,
they also (or mainly) compete for electoral support in order to gain votes in the
electoral competition and, ultimately get into office (Müller and Strøm, 1999). Thus,
electoral incentives might affect the voting behaviour of parliamentary party groups
in a way that is not predictable from a pure policy-seeking point of view.
From this perspective, issue ownership and issue saliency could be even more
important than policy position. ‘The issue ownership thesis – firstly proposed by
John Petrocik (1989, 1996) – claims that voters identify parties with issues: if they
think about the issue, they think about the party. Issue ownership is a matter of
reputation’ (Walgrave and De Swert, 2007, p. 37): if parties are credible and reliable
on certain issues, they are considered to be better able to handle the problem in
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6question than others. The perception of issue ownership by voters is essential for all
parties, and in particular for those parties that are identified with a particular group or
interest. The logical implication of this perspective is that political parties tend to
attach greater relevance to some issues – the issues they own – than to others (Green-
Pedersen, 2007).
The idea of parties having a selective issue emphasis is acknowledged, in
particular, in studies on electoral campaigns and electoral manifestos (Budge and Farlie,
1983; Budge, 1994; Damore, 2004). We can argue that the saliency that parties give to
different issues is likely to have an impact on their voting behaviour in parliament.
Depending on the content, opposition parties might decide to support government bills
involving issues that are less salient to them, and distinguish themselves from the
government on issues that are more relevant to them. Their level of consensus is expected
to be lower on these issues, despite the possible policy gains that might derive from the
laws in question (Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006; De Giorgi, 2011b; Stecker, 2011).
Therefore, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2: The more salient an issue is for an opposition party, the lower the
level of consensus of that party to the government bills dealing with
that issue will be.
As far as the second set of factors is concerned, previous research has emphasised
on how the content of the laws is likely to have a substantive effect on the patterns
of voting behaviour in parliament. According to the existing literature, relevant
strategic incentives for the opposition parties might be linked to those bills strictly
related to the government programmatic declaration (or agreement): ‘while on
other bills the opposition [parties] may offer support depending on the bill’s
inherent merits, they will tend to use all means to block, delay, amend and
denounce government declaration bills […], not only because it opposes the bills’
content, but also as a strategy to harass the government, and eventually bring it
down’ (De Winter, 2004, p. 43). Thus we assume that:
Hypothesis 3: The level of consensus of opposition parties will be lower for bills
that clearly refer to the government programme.
It has been argued (Di Palma, 1977) that the reasons behind the high degree of
consensus in Italian law making during the First Republic were also linked to the
(scarce) quality of the laws enacted. In the widely polarised and fragmented Italian
party system, which was ‘frozen’ in the impossibility of any real alternation in power,
a remarkable number of laws that were limited in both scope and policy comprehen-
siveness used to be approved by the parliament with the support of a large part of
MPs from both majority and opposition benches. Given their usual micro-distributive
nature, these laws were in fact more prone to pork-barrel practices and logrolling by
MPs and party groups, which were instead highly divided on ‘meso-level’ issues
(Cotta, 1996). Individual MPs and parties in parliament might decide to support a
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7given bill that was limited in policy scope and targeted to narrow interests and
constituencies; this might even be the case where preferences on the specific subject
of the bill diverged, because ‘in exchange’ they expected the same support for
another (micro-sectional) bill closer to their own constituencies’ interests. This kind
of ‘exchange’ was (and is) less practicable for bills dealing with major policy issues
and widespread interests. We might therefore posit that:
Hypothesis 4: The level of consensus of the opposition parties is inversely related
to the scope and policy comprehensiveness of the bill under
discussion.
Data and Methods
The dependent variable: Measurement and descriptive statistics
In order to test our hypotheses, we first had to create a group-by-group measure of
consensus. This was achieved using the data on the final passage of government laws
in the Chamber of Deputies.7 We computed the level of consensus of each opposition
party for each law approved in the period under examination as follows: Con-
sensusxi=YESxi+ABSxi/TOTxi, where Consensusxi is the index of consensus of
group x for law i and is equal to the ratio between the sum of ayes (YESxi) and
abstentions (ABSxi)
8 given by the individual MPs belonging to group x and the total
number of members of that group (TOTx). As a result, TOTx implicitly includes all
the possible voting alternatives: ayes, abstentions, nays and not voting.
Empirically speaking, as discussed above, this index measures the relative voting
unity of individual opposition parties in supporting government legislation. If we
considered abstentions as favourable votes and absences as nays, we could have
used other well-consolidated indexes of voting cohesion, such as the Rice index
(Rice, 1928). Nonetheless, we opted for the index of consensus mentioned above
because what we seek is a ‘qualified’ measure of party unity. In fact, we also intend to
explore the ‘direction’ of the opposition parties’ voting behaviour (that is, supporting
or rejecting government legislation) and not only the general intra-party voting
cohesion. Consensusxi goes theoretically from 0 – if all the MPs of group x vote nays
to bill i or do not participate to the vote – to 1 – if all the members of group x were
present and either voted aye or abstained.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics about the level of consensus of each
opposition party in the XIII, XIV and XV legislative terms (1996–2008) together
with the number of votes (that is, voted laws) we observed.9 Significant variations in
the average support of government laws can be noted not only among opposition
parties but also within each party, as demonstrated by the measure of deviation from
the mean values. We address the reasons behind this variation in the next paragraphs.
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As far as our first hypothesis is concerned, for each observed vote we introduced two
measures of the distance between the government and the opposition parties in
relation to their policy preferences. Both measures are based on the position (that is,
the policy preference) of the political actors on a one-dimensional policy space as
provided by expert surveys.
The first measure computes the distance between the opposition party and
government on a broader left–right dimension, by using the parties’ policy positions
estimated by the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey.10 We called this variable
Ideology and we expect it to be negatively related to Consensus (Hypothesis 1).
The second measure computes the distance between the opposition party and
government on the specific policy dimension involved in each law under examina-
tion. In this case, we used data from both the Benoit and Laver (2006) and the 2006
Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe et al, 2010), in order to estimate the position of
both the opposition parties and the government on eight issue-specific policy
dimensions (see Table 2).
More specifically, we relied first on the classification of 21 categories provided by
the Comparative Policy Agendas Project (CoPAP)11 in order to identify the policy
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of consensus by opposition party and legislative term
Party Legislative
term
Number of
votes
Consensus
(mean)
Consensus (standard
deviation)
Consensus
(minimum)
Consensus
(maximum)
AN XIII 291 0.308 0.259 0 0.857
FI XIII 291 0.344 0.261 0 0.813
UDC XIII 113 0.275 0.252 0 0.899
LN XIII 291 0.220 0.246 0 0.864
DS XIV 267 0.354 0.353 0 0.898
MAR XIV 267 0.322 0.315 0 0.937
RC XIV 267 0.163 0.267 0 0.910
AN XV 54 0.309 0.351 0 0.889
FI XV 54 0.344 0.376 0 0.899
UDC XV 54 0.323 0.362 0 0.948
LN XV 54 0.216 0.361 0 1
Note 1: AN – Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance); UDC –Unione di Centro (Centre Union); FI – Forza
Italia (Forza Italia); LN – Lega Nord (Northern League); DS – Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats);
Margherita (Daisy); RC – Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (Refounded Communist Party).
Unfortunately, all of the smaller parties included in the Gruppo Misto (Mixed Group) were excluded from
this analysis, because their votes are not reported separately.
Note 2: Data refer to votes on the 612 government bills that we have selected. For more details on the
selection criteria see the paragraph ‘The selection of laws (and votes)’.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data available on the Italian Law-Making Archive (Borghetto et al, 2012).
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9area involved in each law. Then we assigned each of these 21 categories to 1 of the 8
policy dimensions of the expert surveys and classified each approved law accord-
ingly. Table 2 summarises how the CoPAP issue areas have been matched to the
eight policy dimensions of the expert surveys.
We then computed the issue-specific distance between the opposition party and
government as the absolute difference between the position on the policy dimension
involved in a law taken by the opposition party under consideration and that of the
median party within the cabinet that initiated the legislative proposal. We called this
variable Issue-divisiveness and expect it to be negatively related with Consensus
(Hypothesis 1).
The next variable concerns issue saliency. Both the Benoit and Laver and Chapel
Hill expert surveys score the relevance that each party gives to the different policy
dimensions. Hence, we are able to assign a degree of saliency to each vote under
analysis using the relevance attributed by each opposition party to the policy
dimension involved in each law. We posit Saliency to be negatively associated with
Consensus (Hypothesis 2).
As for the programmatic nature of the voted laws, we used the database on the
activity of the Italian governments that also classifies the laws according to their
relationship with the government’s declaration or coalition agreements (Marangoni,
2010). We created a (dummy) variable called Programme, which is equal to 1 when
the voted law concerns any programmatic announcement of the government, and to 0
Table 2: Assignment of policy issues to policy dimensions
Expert surveys policy dimensions CoPAP policy issues
Economy (increase services versus cut taxes) Macroeconomic issues; health; social welfare
Environment (environment overgrowth versus
growth over environment)
Environment; energy
Deregulation (deregulation of the market versus
state regulation of the market)
Banking and domestic commerce; labour and
employment; foreign trade; technology and
communications; transportation; public land
and water management
Social policy (promote permissive social policies
versus not)
Culture policy issues; education
Civil liberties (promote civil liberties versus support
tough measures to fight crime)
Civil rights; law-crime
Immigration (favour immigrants’ integration versus
contrast immigration)
Immigration
EU: Peacekeeping (favour involvement in
peacekeeping and military operations versus not)
Defence
Decentralisation (promote decentralisation of
government and decision making versus promote
centralisation)
Government operations
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otherwise. As a result, Programme is expected to negatively affect Consensus
(Hypothesis 3).
Finally, we employed the number of advisory (standing) committees to which the
government bills were assigned during their passage through the Chamber of
Deputies12 as a proxy of their policy comprehensiveness. We expect Comprehen-
siveness and Consensus to be negatively related (Hypothesis 4).
Finally, we introduced four control variables. The first variable is related to the
voting procedures. The (dummy) variable Confidence identifies laws that required a
motion of confidence to be approved (value 1 and 0 otherwise). Opposition parties
have a strong incentive to vote against a bill to which the government has attached a
confidence motion, even if there is no real chance of defeating the government: this is
done simply to clearly distinguish from the parties supporting the executive.
Therefore, Confidence is expected to have a negative impact on Consensus.
Then, we introduced two variables to control for the possible ‘distortive’ impact
that party discipline could have on our measure of consensus. The first variable
measures the size of the opposition party. This variable was labelled Party size and is
equal to the number of seats belonging to the opposition party under examination in
the Chamber of Deputies. We introduced this variable by following Curini et al
(2011), showing how larger parties (in the Italian case) tend to be more disciplined
than smaller parties. The other variable, labelled XV legislature, is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for bills voted during the fifteenth legislative term (and value 0
otherwise), as this has been found to be characterised by a significantly lower degree
of individual defections from party lines compared with the other two terms under
investigation (Curini et al, 2011).
The last control variable, Government cohesion, measures the homogeneity of the
government initiating each bill analysed, computed as the absolute distance between
the preferences of the two parties belonging to the government coalition that are most
distant on the specific policy space. We introduced this variable to control for
possible ‘strategic’ behaviour by the opposition party groups. In fact, minority parties
might decide to support a government bill when the ruling coalition is (at least
potentially) divided on the related issue, in order to avoid the (risk of) rejection of
some important measures (such as the budget during a critical financial period) or
even to embarrass the cabinet.
The selection of laws (and votes)
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us briefly go back to the issue of the selection
of laws and their relative votes.
First, we considered all the laws initiated by the executive during the three
legislative terms under analysis. Then we excluded laws that had followed a
decentralised procedure in the Chamber of Deputies – that is, laws that had been
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directly approved by the competent standing committee without passing through the
floor – and also those voted through secret ballot. We also excluded all the laws
related to the ratification of international treaties and agreements. These laws
typically are, in fact, formal acts dealing with issues that have a very limited impact
in terms of public policy, and are normally unanimously approved by the parliament.
Finally, a number of laws were excluded as we were unable to assign them to any of
the eight policy dimensions mentioned above and used to measure the Issue_divi-
siveness and Saliency.
This selection process gave us a total number of 561 laws distributed across the
three legislative terms. As noted above, we measured the level of consensus given by
the opposition parties for each of these laws and this represents our dependent
variable: as a result, each of the 612 selected laws corresponds to as many cases as
the number of opposition parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies when each
law was approved: for a total of 2003 observed votes (see Table 1).
Model and Analysis
Our dependent variable, Consensus, is bounded between 0 – the lowest level of
group consensus – and 1 – the highest level of consensus – and has the typical format
of fractional response data. As a result, the empirical model used to test our
hypotheses is specified as a fractional logit model, as it seemed the best fit for this
kind of data (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Furthermore, given that the votes
included in our database are repeatedly cast by the same parties, we adjusted the
standard errors with clusters on parliamentary groups (Rogers, 1994), so that the
residuals are not independently distributed within each opposition group.
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of some alternative specifications of
our model of the opposition’s consensus.13
In the first model (A), only the government and opposition parties’ policy
preferences are considered (besides the control variables). As expected (Hypothesis 1),
we find that the level of consensus of individual opposition parties tends to decrease
as the opposition party–government distance, on the left–right continuum (Ideology)
and on the issue-specific policy space (Issue_divisiveness) increases.14
Model B introduces in the analysis the second set of factors assumed to affect the
level of consensus of the opposition parties in the law-making process, but excluding
the variables related to policy distance and issue relevance. The results are very
significant. Our third and fourth hypotheses are in fact clearly confirmed by this model.
The programmatic nature of the approved laws (Programme) is found to have a
negative effect on the attitude towards consensus of the opposition parties. Consensus
also tends to decrease, as the policy comprehensiveness of the laws (Comprehensive-
ness) increases.
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Finally, Model C introduces all the independent variables. This last model
confirms all of the results discussed above: as far as magnitude, sign and statistical
significance are concerned, the coefficients of the individual variables remain
substantially the same as those estimated by the previous ‘partial’ models, and are
coherent with our hypotheses. The only exception is represented by the estimated
impact of the relevance given to an issue by individual opposition parties. Indeed,
Saliency presents only small coefficients (in absolute value) that also fail to reach the
standard level of statistical significance.
As for the control variables, we can observe how the level of Consensus tends to
decline in relation to the presence of a motion of confidence by the executive. Party
size has a significant positive effect in all the three models.15 The same is basically
true for the variable XV legislature; however, the related coefficient is not statistically
significant in the first partial model, and Government cohesion proves not to have a
significant impact (at least in statistical terms).
At this point, scholars of legislative behaviour might wonder whether the variables
we introduced in our models, other than being statistically significant, also have a
substantial impact on the level of consensus of the opposition parties. To provide
some insights of this kind, we can estimate the expected level of Consensus, given
the coefficients of Model C at an initial set of values of the covariates and control
variables. As it is common in this kind of estimation, we settle our independent
Table 3: The explanatory factors of the legislative consensus (fractional logit estimation; standard errors
clustered on parliamentary group in parenthesis)
Model A Model B Model C
Covariates
Hypothesis 1: Ideology −0.103 (0.026)*** — −0.116 (0.029)***
Hypothesis 1: Issue_divisiveness −0.105 (0.035)** — −0.107 (0.028)***
Hypothesis 2: Saliency 0.043 (0.048) — 0.055 (0.045)
Hypothesis 3: Programme — −0.518 (0.110)*** −0.512 (0.120)***
Hypothesis 4: Comprehensiveness — −0.111 (0.014)*** −0.113 (0.011)***
Control Variables
Confidence −2.016 (0.199)*** −1.634 (0.188)*** −1.657 (0.168)***
Party size 0.005 (0.000)*** 0.007 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.00)***
XV legislature 0.154 (0.123) 0.272 (0.001)*** 0.286 (0.130)*
Government cohesion −0.022 (0.024) −0.018 (0.028) −0.023 (0.018)
Constant 0.583 (0.305) −0.741 (0.265)** 0.029 (0.282)
Log pseudolikelihood −914.245 −890.333 −878.845
AIC 0.920 0.895 0.887
BIC −14237.21 −14292.63 −14292.80
N 2003 2003 2003
Significance (two tailed): *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.
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variables at their mean or modal values. Therefore, we estimate the expected level of
Consensus of a given opposition party for a non-programmatic bill (Programme= 0),
with Comprehensiveness equal to 5.38. The law has no confidence vote pending
(Confidence= 0). The same bill deals with a policy area with a 6.74 Saliency score
(for the voting opposition party) and entails a distance between opposition party–
government equal to 5.28 on the left–right continuum (Ideology) and 3.55 on the
issue-specific policy dimension (Issue_divisiveness).16 Given all this, the level of
consensus predicted by Model C is 0.30 (or 30per cent). Keeping the other conditions
unaltered, should the same law involve a more divisive issue, with Issue_divisiveness
increasing by one standard deviation (to 5.77), the predicted Consensus would
slightly fall to 25 per cent. While, should also the ideological divide between the
government and the voting party be higher – that is, Ideology increases by one
standard deviation to 6.3 – Consensus would drop to 23.3 per cent.
The substantive impact of the factors related to the ‘nature’ of the government laws
proves to be even bigger. In fact, should the latter hypothetical bill be more
comprehensive – increasing Comprehensiveness by one standard deviation to 8.96
and keeping constant all the other variables – the predicted Consensus would fall to
16.9 per cent. Should this law have also a programmatic nature (Programme= 1), the
level of consensus would drop to 10.8 per cent. Therefore, our results prove to be quite
consistent on the substantive ground, apart from being significant in statistical terms.
Conclusions
This work departed from an interesting fact: despite the significant systemic changes
that have taken place in Italy since the mid-1990s, and the confrontational style that
emerged from the new majoritarian electoral law, the level of the opposition’s
consensus in parliament has not decreased. This consensual pattern of behaviour
cannot therefore be explained simply by looking at the structural factors traditionally
considered to account for the variation in the opposition among countries. This
invited us to explore which other variables could affect the behaviour of the
opposition and determine its (more or less) consensual conduct in the law-making
process, by focusing on the Italian case. To that end, we investigate the voting
behaviour of the Italian parliamentary opposition in the years of the so-called Second
Republic, from 1996 to 2008.
We test two sets of factors in particular that could account for the level of the
opposition’s consensus in the law-making arena: the preferences of the actors
involved in the decision-making process and the characteristics and content of the
approved laws. More specifically, on one hand, we investigate the impact on the level
of consensus of the actors’ policy preferences and issue saliency, and on the other the
effect of the (more or less) programmatic nature of the approved laws and their level
of comprehensiveness.
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The statistical models that we estimate provide solid empirical corroboration for
our hypotheses. It is demonstrated that the preferences and ideological stances of
opposition parties do affect the relative level of consensus on the passage of
government legislation in parliament.
Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that the more or less conflictual pattern of
legislative behaviour also depends on the capability of the executive as a decision
maker in the legislative arena: the more the executive is able to issue legislative acts
covering wider cross-sectional policy areas, and especially dealing with the govern-
ment’s programmatic pledges and priorities, the more conflictual the behaviour of the
opposition parties will be.
This last evidence also helps us in solving the initial puzzle of this work: why
the opposition’s (consensual) behaviour has not substantially changed, despite the
significant transformation of the Italian political system? The response seems to lie in
the missed institutionalisation of the majoritarian model, in which the executive has a
programme and realises that, thanks to the support of a solid and stable parliamentary
majority. This is not yet the case in Italy. If the executives of the Second Republic have
been formed on the basis of more and more defined programmatic priorities and public
policy objectives (although with a certain degree of variability from one government to
the other), the transformation of these objectives into legislative action still encounters
great difficulties. The change of the electoral system, the renewal of the party system,
the end of the exclusion of the more extreme parties from the competition for
government and the consequent realisation of alternation between two different
coalitions of government have undoubtedly shifted the axis of democracy in Italy to a
type of more ‘moderate’ consensualism, but have not yet brought to the realisation of
the majoritarian model in its broadest sense. This is, in our opinion, one of the main
reasons of the missed transformation of the Italian opposition’s behaviour in parliament.
To conclude, generally speaking, it can be said that the opposition’s consensus on
government legislation is not unconditional: it is affected by specific factors that we
attempt to identify. Further research is undoubtedly required to confirm the results
obtained so far. Notably, a comparative analysis is clearly crucial to corroborate our
findings: as this opposition consensus pattern seems to be common to many
European parliamentary democracies, the present study on the factors, which could
account for such a dynamic, should be replicated in further national cases.
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Notes
1 In support to this assumption, see also the Journal of Legislative Studies, 14: 1, 2008 and, in particular,
Helms (2008) and Norton’s (2008) contributions.
2 The new government coalition was formed by Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of
the Left) – composed of former Communist Party (PCI) members who had agreed with the party
transformation of the early 1990s – and Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party), which had
formed a new alliance together with some other minor centre parties and the Greens: Ulivo (Olive
Tree). Rifondazione Comunista (Refounded Communist Party) gave its external support to the
government until 1998, but did not officially take part in it.
3 The UDC was the result of the union of the former Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD) with another
small Christian Democratic party.
4 The former Ulivo coalition was renamed as L’Unione (The Union) and was enlarged to cover a wider
range of centre-left parties: Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of Left), Margherita (Daisy), Partito
della Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party), Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (Party
of Italian Communist), Federation of the Greens, Italia dei Valori and some other minor parties and
movements.
5 An important issue should be addressed here. Intra-party heterogeneity and different level of party
discipline might, in fact, affect the level of consensus that we measure. This could introduce exogenous
factors into the picture and we should take this into consideration. However, recent studies have
showed that the traditional image of the discipline of the Italian parties is still valid, at least in the field
of legislative voting (Curini et al 2011). In light of these results, we consider the level of party
discipline as almost constant across parties (with some specifications that we will introduce later on).
6 Here we assume that MPs belonging to a given party share the same basic policy preferences. We are
aware that this is a questionable assumption, as showed by the extant research estimating MPs policy
preferences from their voting behaviour (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Poole, 2005) or legislative
discourse (Proksch and Slapin, 2010; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). However, as formally our dependent
variable is a (group by group) aggregation of individual behaviours, we need a more general measure.
We are confident that the position of each party on a given policy space (see below for the discussion
on the estimation of such a position) provides a sufficiently reliable measure on this regard. In fact,
generally speaking it can be expected that, notwithstanding individual differences, the preferences of
(most of) the MPs belonging to a given opposition party group are closer to the position of this group
than to the preferences of the government (especially when the latter are far from the preferences of the
same group.
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7 Those data were available thanks to the Italian Law-Making Archive of the Standing Group of the
Italian Political Science Association (www.sociol.unimi.it/ricerca/parlamento).
8 We treat abstentions as a form of consensual behaviour and consequently place them at the numerator
together with the ayes. This is so because the internal rules of the Italian Chamber of Deputies do not
consider abstentions as valid votes for the calculation of the majority necessary to approve a bill
(despite counting them to reach the legal quorum). As a consequence, abstaining has the ‘technical’
effect of lowering the number of ayes necessary for a bill to be approved by the voting MPs (facilitating
the satisfaction of the legal quorum criterion). Following a similar logic, we consider absences as a
particular kind of conflictual behaviour: the opposition party members might choose absenteeism for
either symbolic or strategic reasons: in order to respectively publicly dissociate themselves from a
given legislative proposal or try to prevent the Chamber reaching the legal quorum. We consequently
stopped examining the UDC voting behaviour from that time until the end of the term.
9 Note that the number of voted laws is identical for each group in the same legislature. The only
exception is the UDC in the XIII legislature, because this group split up in the middle of the term
because of some defections and its remaining members had to join the Mixed Group.
10 We used the score of the median party within the cabinet coalition to estimate the position of the
government on the left–right continuum.
11 For further details, see the Comparative Policy Agendas Project at www.comparativeagendas.org.
12 Any time a bill is introduced to the parliament, it is contextually submitted to the standing
parliamentary committee, which is entitled to deal with the main policy area at stake. The committee
starts to examine – and even modify – the bill before sending it to the floor. Depending on the content
of the bill and as a consequence on the number of policy areas directly or indirectly tackled by the same
legislative proposal, further standing committees might be asked to give their opinion on it. Hence, the
number of advisory committees involved in the examination of the bill might be seen as a proxy of its
policy scope and comprehensiveness. As a result, we can expect that the number of advisory
committees to which the bill has been sent is positively associated with the amount of different policy
issues it deals with.
13 Statistical estimations have been made using Stata 11. Data and code for replication are available upon
request.
14 In order to deal with the risk of collinearity between Ideology and Issue divisiveness, we have also
tested two other models that alternatively exclude one of the two variables in question. The results,
however, are not substantially altered.
15 Note that further models were estimated to check interaction effects between our covariates. However,
none of the interaction terms proved to be statistically significant. Therefore, we decided not to show
these models. To check for the robustness of our results, we also estimated a series of models with
policy area dummies, as well as models where standard errors are clustered, alternatively, by laws,
legislative terms and cabinets. All these analyses do not substantially alter the results presented here.
16 With the other control variables settled at their mean (party size and government cohesion) or modal
values (which is equal to 0 for XV legislature).
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